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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the initial system
studies being performed at JPL on secure
voice for mobile satellite applications. Some
options are examined for adapting existing
STU III secure telephone equipment for use
over a digital mobile satellite link, as well as
for the evolution of a dedicated secure voice
mobile earth terminal (MET). The work has
included some laboratory and field testing of
prototype equipment.
The work is part of an ongoing study at
JPL for the National Communications
System (NCS) on the use of mobile satellites
for emergency communications. The purpose
of the overall task is to identify and enable
the technologies which will allow the NCS to
utilize mobile satellite services for its
National Security Emergency Preparedness
(NSEP) communications needs. Various
other government agencies will also
contribute to a mobile satellite user base, and
for some of these, secure communications
will be an essential feature.
BACKGROUND
There is a trend toward digital
implementation of voice in most mobile
communications services. This includes the
United States versions of Cellular Telephone,
Mobile Radio, the land mobile satellite
service (LMSS), as well as European
developed systems such as CT2, and the
various international mobile satellite services
(MSS). While not necessarily the case for
first generation systems, the data rate for
future digital voice systems appears to be
converging toward a 4.8 kbps compromise
between quality and bandwidth r.equirements.
A leading candidate for a voice encoding
standard in the U.S. is the 4800 bps Code
Excited Linear Predictive (CELP) voice
coder defined in Proposed Federal Standard
1016.
Secure voice capability would be a useful
addition to most mobile, small terminal,
communications services in applications such
as disaster communications and others where
privacy may be important. Coincidentally, the
mobile earth terminals (MET's) for all these
services contain very similar functional
blocks, which works in favor of a common
secure voice interface. The options to be
considered are whether the secure voice
capability should be added as an external
interface to the MET, or built into the MET.
MET FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS
A generic MET contains the following
elements: a voice codec, a coder/decoder for
forward error correction (FEC), a modem,
and a transceiver, as shown in block diagram
form in Figure 1. In addition to these basic
functions there is usually circuitry for call set-
up, and an interface for external digital data,
most likely at point A on the block diagram.
STU III FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS
The STU-III (Secure Telephone Unit III)
is a communications terminal unit that
connects to the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) and allows the user to make
secure telephone calls.
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In the non-secure mode of operation, a
STU III operates as an ordinary telephone,
using analog voice and all the signalling of
plain old telephone service (POTS).
In the secure mode, the voice signal is
di$itized and compressed to a rate of 2.4 kbps
using a LPC-10 algorithm. The compressed
voice signal is then encrypted and is output
on a subcarrier in V.26 format. During the
secure call set-up there is also some
signalling and echo canceler control using
2100 Hz tones, as well as digital hand
shaking.
A functional block diagram of the present
generation STU III is shown in Figure 2. It
should be noted that the STU III has a key
element of a MET, the voice codec, but that
certain signal combinations, such as digitized
clear voice and the encrypted voice data
stream at baseband, are not available at the
output.
The next generation STU Ill's, which will
become available in late 1990, will include
4.8 kbps voice using the CELP voice coder
defined in Proposed Federal Standard 1016.
In the secure mode the output signal will be
in V.32 format.
STU III INTERFACING
To interface the present generation STU
III to a digital link, therefore, requires that its
analog signals be digitized externally and the
V.26 signal be restored to baseband by means
of another V.26 modem. This can be
accomplished by means of an adapter at both
the mobile and the earth station ends of the
link. Companies such as Electrospace, Inc., of
Richardson, Texas, Stanford Telecommuni-
cations, Inc. of Santa Clara, California, and
some of the STU III vendors have worked on
the development of such an adapter.
Three options exist for interfacing the next
generation STU equipment to a digital link.
These options are for the MET end of the
link. In all cases an adapter will still be
needed at the satellite base station to provide
the conversion between the digital data
stream and the analog signals reqmred by the
PSTN.
One option is to develop a similar adapter,
capable of operating at 4.8 kbps. Such an
adapter would provide essentially identical
functions at either end of the link.
The second is to develop a STU III version
that provides the digital encrypted voice
signal as well as digitized secure call set-up
signals as direct outputs. This would provide
a simpler interface to the MET. One
question to be resolved is whether the STU
III or MET voice codec would be used during
clear voice operation.
The third option is to develop an
integrated STU III MET. The secure call set-
up and encryption functions could be
provided as an optional module to a common
MET.
THE LMSS CHANNEL
In clear line-of-sight conditions, the LMSS
channel can be impaired by multipath signal
components and vehicle motion induced
Doppler. The most serious problem,
however, is caused by signal blockage due to
roadside obstacles. An example time plot of
satellite signal strength data, measured in a
fairly benign rural environment, is shown in
Figure 3. The signal dropouts are caused by
trees, telephone poles and other obstacles,
and can last significant fractions of a second
at normal driving speeds. Signal loss can
easily be greater than 10 dB and providing
link margin to overcome this phenomenon
under all conditions is impractical.
OPERATION OVER THE LMSS LINK
Links over this type of channel are
generally protected with some type of FEC
coding, including time interleaving to break
up the signal dropout induced error bursts
prior to decoding.
The amount of time interleaving that is
practical in a duplex voice link, however,
cannot protect the link from most of these
dropouts. It is therefore important that the
system be able to resynchronize rapidly. In
more difficult environments such as suburban
and urban locations, operational problems
such as complete loss of link may result. For
STU III operation, the signal dropout
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problem may result in frequently dropping
out of the secure mode. Reestablishing the
secure mode must be initiated manually and
can become burdensome if needed often
enough.
Link error protection and signal dropout
mitigation are thus very important, especially
while operating a secure link. This however
can only be done to a limited extent. Certain
environments will still be difficult to operate
in, and this must be understood by potential
users of the system.
ERROR PROTECTION
Error protection can be applied in layers.
The MET FEC coder will apply an outer
code to the composite data stream. The more
critical signals, such as those involved in the
call set-up process can be further encoded.
Further protection of the critical bits of the
voice codec output is also planned in some
systems. For example, the proposed CELP
codec employs an error correcting Hamming
code within the voice frame.
In a non-secure voice MET there will be
two basic phases of operation; the call set-up
and the conversation phase. Call set-up may
take place end to end over a dedicated
request channel, or additional routing
through the PSTN may be allowed by dialing
over the assigned voice channel. Dial tones
must of course be converted to digital codes,
but they are generated so slowly that they can
be reliably encoded.
In the case of a secure MET using a STU
III, signal structure is even more complex
because there are four additional signalling
phases. These consist of a status phase, a
crypto variable exchange phase, a crypto
s)mchronization data exchange phase, and
finally, the secure communications phase.
These are described briefly below. More
detailed information on the structure of these
signals is contained in [1] and [2].
The status phase is used to set up the
secure link. The secure call is initiated by one
of the users pressing the "secure" button on
the STU-III. That unit is now known as the
initiator unit. The initiator sends a 2100 Hz
tone (the 2100 Hz tone disables the echo
suppression and echo cancelers on the
telephone line). After some hand shaking,
the initiator turns off the 2100 Hz tone. The
two units then send signal patterns that are
used to train the modem echo cancelers and
the modem equalizers. This completes the
first stage.
The crypto variable stage exchanges status
and FIREFLY protected messages
(FIREFLY is the encryption scheme). This is
done to establish a cryptographic variable
that is used by the STU-III's. The STU-III's
perform several checks on the bits, including
a parity check. If the data fails any of the
checks, the secure call is terminated; these
bits are not error correction coded. Next, the
STU-III's exchange Random Component
Cipher (RCC) messages. The RCC is
FIREFLY encrypted and BCH encoded.
Upon receipt, the RCC is BCH decoded and
decrypted, and processed. If the message fails
any of the processin_ parity checks, the call is
terminated. Otherwise, the call proceeds to
the next phase.
The STU-III's next exchange Crypto
Synchronization (CS) messages. This occurs
both at call set up and any time the call is
interrupted. The CS is used to coordinate the
selection of the secure mode, to align each
STU-III's receive key generator to the other
unit's key generator, and to coordinate the
start of the secure transmission. Once the
units are in sync, secure communications can
begin. This is indicated by the STU-III
"scrolling" messages about the CIK
classification across the LCD display and
then displaying the message "SECURE".
Once the link is secure, the user can end
the call by either hanging up, which
disconnects the link between the STU-III's,
or he can push the "Non-Secure" button,
which returns the units to non-secure
communication. If the units drop out of sync,
the CS messages are sent again.
As was mentioned previously, the outer
coder will use time interleaving in
combination with some type of error
correcting code. The JPL MSAT project has
chosen a trellis code for this application.
Golay codes have been studied for this
application in Land Mobile Radio [3]. The
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type of coding and modulation to be specified
by the American Mobile Satellite
Corporation (AMSC) and other LMSS
system providers has not yet been specified.
MSAT MET DESIGN
The MSAT MET was designed with a
combination of coding and modulation which
provides robust performance over a LMSS
channel, yet numnuzes bandwidth
requirements. The FEC and modulation
functions are implemented within the modem
and use time interleaving and combined rate
2/3 trellis coded modulation (TCM)/eight
phase differentially encoded phase shift
keying (8DPSK). This allows a 4.8 kbps data
stream to utilize a 5 kHz wide channel.
The time interleaving helps break up the
error bursts caused by signal drop-outs.
Another feature of the modem is the use of
differentially coherent demodulation. This
and a very stable clock results in
instantaneous recovery after a signal dropout.
The ability of the symbol clock to coast
through long signal dropouts greatly
diminishes the need for interleaver and voice
codec resynchronization.
PROTOTYPE SYSTEM TESTING
A prototyl?, e system was tested in mid 1989
by JPL, using MSAT equipment and a
developmental model Digital Transmission
Interface (DTI) supplied by Electrospace,
Inc.
The test set-up consisted of a pair of STU
III's, DTI's, and MSAT METs (with the
voice codecs bypassed). The STU III output
data rate was doubled to 4.8 kbps by bit
stuffing in order to match the data rate of the
MSAT equipment. No additional error
protection, other than provided by the MSAT
system, was implemented due to schedule
constraints.
Testing was accomplished in two stages,
first in the laboratory, then in the field in
Australia using the Japanese experimental
satellite ETS V. Field testing in Australia was
done in conjunction with a scheduled MSAT-
X field test.
Testing in the laboratory was
accomplished using a satellite channel
simulator which can be used to add Gaussian
noise, produce signal fading by introducing
multipath signals, and simulate other signal
impairments. The actual measured satellite
signal strength data of Figure 3 was also used
to drive the simulator and ensure that the
system would work in the field.
Minimum signal to noise ratio conditions
for secure call set-up and secure call
maintenance were investigated. The secure
call set-up phase was more sensitive to
channel impairments. Once a secure call was
established, the signal to noise ratio could be
lowered and the link was more tolerant of
impairments such as signal dropouts.
In Australia, a secure link was set up and
maintained over a satellite link which was
operating with very little margin and was
affected by multipath and blockage by
roadside obstacles. Details of the testing are
available in [4].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Several options exist for incorporating
secure voice rata LMSS METs. Ideally, STU
III functions should be incorporated directly
into LMSS MET equipment. Special
attention must be paid to error protecnon of
the signalling that _s part of secure call set-up
and operation.
The LMSS channel is very difficult to
quantify because its characteristics can vary
so much from region to region. A great deal
of propagation data has been gathered by
both the JPL MSAT Project and NASA
Propagation Program. It is available to
anyone working in the area of mobile
satellite MET design. Use of this data will
allow the testing of proposed modulation and
error protection techniques under realistic
operating conditions.
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